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Abstract 
 
Contemporary microfinance has been taken to task over a number of possible failings.  At the 
same time insight into grassroots microfinance institution (MFI) failure is lacking.  To that 
end this paper seeks to articulate and explain different stakeholder narratives about how a 
once promising Zambian microfinance institution actually failed while seeking to become a 
for-profit MFI. There are presently few in-depth studies of failed MFIs in those countries 
where microfinance is still emerging, just as it is in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and greater 
focus upon high profile performers in South Asia and Latin America, which leaves other 
developments in regions such as SSA much less represented. Using field data from Zambia 
this study examines the failure of Promotion of Rural Initiatives and Development 
Enterprises (PRIDE Zambia, hereafter PZ) initiative. It finds poorly practiced governance and 
accountability mechanisms, and unstable relationships between international donors and the 
Board, the Board and CEO and with middle management, to be central to its final failure. The 
study also reveals a lack of transparency and disregard for moral obligations, and poses 
serious questions about how it and its finances were managed and accounted for, even while 
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MFIs are organizations which were originally set up in order to help finance those small scale 
micro-enterprises and local economic activities which were largely excluded from formal 
finance and mainstream banking practice. However, in Sub-Saharan Africa, microfinance is 
not yet widespread and most low income earners,  including many of the poor, cannot access 
financial services (CGAP, 2009; Spencer &Wood, 2005) while poverty is officially 
widespread and acute (World Bank, 2009). There are also significant disparities in the level 
of development and performance across different countries (MIX, 2010). While the 
developed microfinance institutions (MFIs) of South Asia and Latin America are challenged 
to become more commercially viable, emerging – often donor dependent - MFIs in sub-
Saharan Africa can struggle to survive. Inexperienced staff, questionable working practices, 
poor internal controls, substandard governance (Mersland and Strom, 2009; Hartarska, 2005) 
and inadequate management information systems all contribute to African MFI 
underperformance (CGAP, 2009). In Nigeria, for example, a lack of competent and skilled 
‘human capital’ has been identified as a particular failing (Microfinance Africa, May 2010). 
In Zambia, Siwale (2006) previously scrutinized CETZAM’s near collapse and observed how 
its subsequent restructuring embraced policy and senior management, product diversification, 
and further grassroots staff changes in branches. Similarly, Moroccan MFIs were found to 
lack the necessary skills, knowledge and experience with some being accused of fraud and 
embezzlement of depositors’ funds. Studies elsewhere suggest that many crises are not just 
random, one off events apart, but originate in serious, and maybe also potentially predictable 
and/or avoidable, management and intelligence failings (Vaughan, 1996). Underperformance 
shadows MFI development in Southern Africa (Lafourcade, Isern, Mwangi, & Brown, 2005; 
Chiumya, 2006; Dixon, et al, 2007) and formal evaluations of impact assessment, program 
replication, client outreach and financial sustainability (Copestake, 2002) typically suggest 
that progress here lags significantly behind that which has been claimed for South Asia and 
Latin America (MIX, 2010; Basu, Blavy, & Yulek, 2004).  
 
The Zambian Context 
 
Zambian MFIs’ donor dependence (Bateman, 2010) has potentially serious implications. For 
example, Musona (2002), Chiumya (2006), and Dixon et al (2007) reveal how relatively high 
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operating costs, delinquency and default, low client intake/retention, potential fraud, and high 
staff turnover impede sustainability, and much vaunted outreach levels have been lagging 
behind East Africa for example. This high dependence on donor funds that can be found in 
many sectors in Zambia is particularly damaging in microfinance, where financial 
sustainability is of fundamental importance. Indeed, many face important management and 
corporate governance challenges. Major Zambian MFIs, except for FINCA, have struggled to 
reach desired client numbers (fig 1.0). As early as 2002, certain donor driven MFIs 
nevertheless maintained that market-based approaches could ‘transform’ this situation even 
though most Zambian MFIs were only just founded in the late 1990s (Siwale, 2006). Since 
then microfinance has not grown in line with outside expectation (see figure 1.0 regarding 
major MFIs) and Chiumya (2006) indeed identified rising signs of its possible stagnation and 
contraction. The PZ case is therefore broadly emblematic of microfinance development at 








Zambian MFIs might potentially provide much needed, but hitherto scarce, financial services 
in a country where, even by prevailing standards, access remains extremely low (FinScope, 
2010; Mattoo and Payton, 2007). The Association of Microfinance Institutions of Zambia 
(AMIZ) has estimated that the industry’s outreach is in the region of 250,000 to 300,000 
active borrowers (largely due to an influx of new consumption based MFIs).  19 out of 25 
licensed MFIs founded in the last 5 years have indeed been expressly consumer lending 
based. Since these MFIs do not emphasize small scale enterprise development they simply 
require formal employment before making a loan. However, an estimated 60,000 borrowers 
occupy the same enterprise loan market niche in which PZ operated. Additionally, the scope 
of services has also been particularly limited, with little savings mobilization to date (Dixon, 
Ritchie, & Siwale, 2006). The law however has changed following the 2006 Banking and 
Financial Services (microfinance) Regulations Act which has enabled MFIs to mobilize 
further public deposits and savings. According to BOZ, 43  out of 25 licensed institutions 
have been granted deposit taking licenses. More importantly, the Act has established 
governance rules and formal accountability channels with the central bank, so that MFIs 
might evolve into limited companies with identifiable share holders (AMIZ magazine, June 
2010). However, there is as yet little serious empirical study of Zambian microfinance, where 
institutional performance data is still considered proprietary, and remains difficult to access4. 
Enhanced disclosure might reveal more but, so far, the few impact studies have concentrated 
upon CETZAM (Cheston, et al., 2000; Copestake et al. 2001; Copestake, 2002),  except for 
Copestake, Bhalotra and Johnson’s (1998) study of the Peri-Urban Lusaka Small Enterprise 
(PULSE). No similar impact studies have been conducted on PZ itself.  
 
In explaining the demise of PZ this paper, argues that Zambian microfinance development 
has been largely donor driven and ‘top-down’, leaving many precariously founded, and soon 
needing to reorganize in fear that they might otherwise fail. Even certain stakeholder 
accounts of PZ’s own failure diverge, especially between its funders and managers, and also 
frontline. By articulating and explaining what happened when PZ actually failed, and how 
this failure was variously accounted for, this paper highlights how the most well-
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intentioned/altruistic international donors can still find themselves in a ‘no win’ position as 
their much –vaunted developmental initiatives materialize. 
Investigating failure of microfinance institutions is important because of the significant 
resources they leverage in regard to poverty alleviation. The study is also warranted by the 
dearth of empirical research about developing country MFI failure, especially in a SSA 
context, where commercialisation might increasingly override other governance issues. This 
study can help bridge a number of prevailing gaps in knowledge by observing how failure 
actually originates and materializes in the light of different stakeholder accounts of it. There 
are few notable field studies of what happens when and while MFIs fail (Fisher, 2002), 
especially those under pressure to commercialize. Other accounts of failed MFIs- especially 
those from under researched areas like sub-Saharan Africa are liable to be ignored because 
they might also challenge current fashionable ‘best practices’. Such accounts likewise 
question prevailing heroic success stories of ‘bottom-up’ development institutions arising 
from pioneering regions of South Asia and Latin America. However, other organizational 
studies elsewhere (Francis and Zheng, 2010; Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004, 2010; Tedlow, 
2008) indicate the importance of learning from successes, crises and failures alike.  While it 
might be argued that, economic, political, historical, cultural and geographical context is 
important, other MFIs elsewhere might well draw lessons from the PZ case.  
 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The following section reviews the existing 
literature about organizational failure at large. It is followed by an outline of the approach 
here adopted to gather and interpret the necessary data from what was an inevitably highly 
charged field situation. It then details the PZ case in terms of stakeholder accounts of its 
eventual failure. Finally the particular implications of these findings are discussed. 
 
 Literature review/conceptual framework  
According to industrial organization literature, the causes of organizational failure can be 
attributed to external factors, largely beyond the control of managers (McGahan, and Porter, 
1997; Rumelt, 1991). Supporters of this view argue that organizational failure does not imply 
management ineffectiveness or inefficiency (Mellahi et al., 2002), while organizational 
studies’ literature places more emphasis on internal organizational factors as cause of failure 
(Tedlow, 2008). This position attributes failure primarily to operating problems within the 
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firm as a result of the actions or inactions of managers in a changing environment (Barker & 
Duhaime, 1997 in Amankwah-Amoah and Debrah, Y.A. 2010, p. 640). Based on this 
perspective, failure can be associated with a lack of managerial foresight and failure of top 
management (and Board of directors) to respond. For example, Mellahi (2005) argues that, 
board members fulfil an advisory duty as they are expected to bring in knowledge and 
experience from their past managerial experiences and (and in some cases) membership on 
other boards. Also, Mellahi and Wilkinson (2004) find composition of top management teams 
and managerial succession to be particularly salient with respect to organizational failure, 
while Hambrick and Mason (1984) add, an organization is “a reflection of its top managers”. 
Mellahi and Wilkinson (2010) also observe that, “symptoms’ of organizational failure include 
market share erosion, persistent low or negative profitability, shrinking critical-that is 
financial, human, and technological-resources, and /or loss of legitimacy (p.533).  
According to Gillespie and Dietz’s (2009) definition of failure, “locus of control for the 
failure is internal to the organization even though the context for failure may involve external 
influences” and occurs as a result of “actions, or negligent inaction” from managers (p. 129). 
This view of failure has found support amongst researchers arguing for effective governance 
within MFIs (Mersland and Strom (2009), while others find the microfinance sector to have 
experienced some major failures where, among other reasons for these failures, the 
inadequacy of governance practices was to blame (Labie, 2001). In addition to weak 
governance practices, there has been a tremendous growth and institutionalization process 
experienced by some organizations that is providing an interesting area for further research 
(especially in SSA) aimed at improving internal control mechanisms, especially mechanisms 
linked to board action. Accordingly, Mersland and Strom (2009) suggest that financial 
performance improves with local rather than international directors supported by an internal 
board auditor, while Hardy et al. (2003) argue for a better MFI regulation. CGAP (2008) 
identified poor governance as a major obstacle to MFI growth. In the microfinance literature, 
the analysis of governance has evolved from a principal-agent theory to a more complex, 
multi-stakeholder one (Giovanna Pugliese, 2010). The discussion here is partly guided by 
Mellahi and Wilkinson’s (2004) integrative theoretical framework that asserts that: ‘any 
attempt to explain organizational failure must take into account both the interplay between 





Research Methods  
Organizational failure in practice is a complex phenomenon which is unusually difficult for 
intending researchers to design and rigorously control, especially while the process is still 
under way, and the full consequences may not have materialized (Mellahi &Wilkinson, 
2004). The PZ case was part of the longer term study described below and employs a 
combination of internal documentary sources (including correspondence between the 
Swedish International Development Authority – SIDA - and PZ Board members and minutes 
of meetings) as well as semi-structured interviews with SIDA officials, the Director of the 
Association of Microfinance Institutions, and former PZ managers. It draws upon both the 
researcher’s own long term ‘indigenous knowledge’, including prior doctoral fieldwork 
conducted in Zambia between November 2003 and July 2004, but for this specific purpose, 
the study relies upon close intensive research conducted between July and August 2010 to 
reveal more about PZ’s final failure. The prior fieldwork included three months of 
observing/shadowing loan officers’ (and clients) at work 
 
A case study approach was adopted in line with prior suggestion that “in general, case studies 
are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the 
investigator has little control over events and when focus is on a contemporary phenomenon 
within some real-life context” (Yin, 2003: p 17). As Eisenhardt (1989, p.542) noted, research 
studies that are rich in qualitative data are particularly useful for providing “a good 
understanding of the dynamics underlying [a] relationship, that is, the ‘why’ of what is 
happening”. Furthermore, the use of case studies enables researchers to provide detailed 
description of in situ actions. The research sought data which could provide a telling narrative 
about unfolding events at PZ in response to key questions such as: 
  -Why did such a promising development institution fail? 
  - What made and produced the manner of its failure? 
  - What lessons might other MFIs draw from it? 
To explore these and other issues, access to documents (made possible under freedom of 
information) from the Swedish embassy in Lusaka also shed important light on Pride Zambia 
and its dealings with the donors, while in situ interviews with key informants reveal further 
internal conflict and struggle. Given the complexity of this study, it was important that the 
methodology should reveal both the ‘multiple realities’ of the key events and also illuminate 
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the uncertainty and anxiety surrounding them. This proved particularly difficult for some 
leading authority figures, PZ’s board of directors and senior manager included, although it is 
often difficult to persuade managers and others closely bound up with failed organizations 
elsewhere to freely and openly participate in research exploring how such failure actually 
occurs (Barker & Patterson, 1996). Only after repeated assurance did the former CEO agree 
to be interviewed but even then there were such objections to audio-recording that the 
researcher was duly instructed not to take notes of discussions unless expressly told to do so.  
After persistent attempts to secure interviews, two Board members still declined, and duly 
ignored further email requests. SIDA differed in that it facilitated due access to 
correspondence and board meeting minutes in the period from 2006 to December 2008. Such 
different sources allowed triangulation of data to increase the reliability of the findings. 
PZ at Founding Stage 
Before failing in 2009, this was one of Zambia’s largest donor funded MFIs. It was founded as 
Pride Africa in February 2000 following a project funding agreement between PRIDE Africa 
SIDA. At the time its main stated goal was to be the premier financial services provider to the 
personal and small micro medium enterprise (SMME) markets. Its Board was appointed in 
May 2001, under PRIDE Africa Zambia and duly contracted PRIDE Managements Services 
Ltd (PMSL) from Kenya to manage the venture. However, this arrangement proved 
unsatisfactory and costly and in 2003 a loss of US$560, 000 was reported (Memo, 2008). In 
2004, the Board replaced PSML with a locally appointed CEO, tasked to implement a business 
restructuring plan to ‘transform’ the venture into a Shareholding Company and attain self-
sustainability by 2006 and attract equity and/or loan capital. PRIDE Zambia’s reported 
outreach peaked in 2004 with 5,037 active borrowing clients5 (56 percent women) but client 
numbers had started to decline by December 2005 to 4,591 (see fig. 2.0) against a benchmark 
of 8,000 active clients. Documents indicated that PZ never achieved its target client numbers of 
11,000 in 2006 and 12,000 in 2007 as set out in its Business Plan 2005-2007. 
                                                          





(Note: 2007 client numbers increased mainly due to an increase in salary guaranteed and individual loans in an 
effort to remain sustainable. They should be treated with caution as there were no independent records from AMIZ 
and MIX to confirm this). 
Portfolio at risk was estimated at 7.38 percent as at June 30, 20046, but rose to 50.08% (MIX, 
2007) by 2006. All but one branch incurred losses. Borrowers per loan officer dropped to 119 
against the target of 350. After 2007, client numbers remained largely unidentifiable (Acting 
CEO, August, 2008).  
In its 8 years of existence, PRIDE had introduced four loan products:1) Group Loan Scheme: 
targeted at low-income entrepreneurs with an initial loan threshold of K350, 000 (US$78); 2) 
the Premium Loan which targeted medium income entrepreneurs who worked in groups of 
five at an initial loan threshold of K3 million (US$667); 3) the while the Salary Guaranteed 
Loan which could extend credit to a maximum amount of K15 million (US$3334) to salaried 
employees in the formal sector; and 4) the Individual/Business loan aimed at entrepreneurs 
                                                          
6 Reported figures on borrowing clients, PAR and loan portfolio from three different sources could not be 
reconciled. Figures reported in Musona’s report (2004), AMIZ Annual Microfinance statistics (2004), the MIX 
Market website, and other material made available for this study contained many inconsistencies. For example, 
PAR, >30 days was reported to be 5.25% on MIX market and yet internal records indicated 7.38%. These 





with a guarantor and collateral for loan advances. PZ formally expected to register its first 
surplus in 2005 after implementing performance enhancing measures (2004 report to SIDA). 
However, its performance (Fig. 1.0), like that of other Zambian MFIs  was considered 
unimpressive as a result of overzealous expansion, coupled with frequent top management 
changes, loose adherence to set lending procedures, relatively inexperienced frontline 
workers, and also deeper insinuations about possible large scale financial fraud by its credit 
officers and/or top management staff (Dixon, et., al. 2007).  
Prior research had already uncovered highly stressed relationships between senior management 
and branch managers as well as growing private frustration amongst frontline loan officers, 
some of whom feared that further commercialization would undermine their jobs. The set 
lending methodology could be manipulated to meet targets and there were also reports of 
possible fraud (Siwale, 2006). Client groups were becoming ineffectual wherever loan officers 
were more preoccupied with stringent debt collection than enabling further group formation 
and development. Staff turnover increased among those who were most uncertain about the 
institution’s future under the new CEO whom some privately considered to lack relevant 
grassroots experience. They also feared ‘PZ’s possible incorporation into mainstream banking 
on the basis that it still lacked the necessary systems and capabilities and would be found 
wanting as a result. Some clients however also claimed that PZ was on par with other MFIs in 
respect of its local reputation for being ‘opportunistic and uncaring’, a proverbial ‘vulture’ 
capitalizing others vulnerability and financial illiteracy for its own, largely self-serving ends.  
PZ Post Founding: ‘Transformation’ 2006-2009 
Anticipating what demands Zambia’s new 2006 Act for non-bank financial institutions would 
place on PZ, in January 2006, SIDA requested a transformation Consultancy from Enterprise 
Solutions Global Consulting with the intention of planning how it would become a limited 
liability company. SIDA pledged 240,000SEK equivalent to USD 29560 for a plan7 which 
would cover 2006-2009.  Documents obtained from the Swedish Embassy revealed that the 
co-operating partners had also been concerned about how PZ intended to respond to low 
client numbers by opening more branches rather than expanding its existing branch network 
                                                          
7 Bank of Zambia introduced a new legislation in 2006, which among other things required all non-bank 
financial institutions to transform into shareholding companies. PZ had to comply and convert itself into a 




and staff. The partners also expressed concern about its rising portfolio at risk (>30 days 
PAR) which then stood at 50%, and wanted to know how much progress had been made to 
reduce PAR and improve debt recovery. Risk management and organizational improvement 
were SIDA’s declared key priorities. Meanwhile, the PZ Board used the business plan 2006-
2009 to request special support for employee retrenchment packages, renegotiate long term 
loan conditions, and secure additional operational funding. However, co-operating partners 
only agreed to a two years grace period on the loan, rejected the retrenchment proposals, and 
maintained that they would only consider new funding on condition that PAR 30 fell below 
5% (Board meeting minutes, 06/11/06-accessed 4/8/10, SIDA).  
While SIDA’s contracted law firm prepared documents for converting it into a limited 
company by shares, PZ’s problems then became increasingly public. In early 2007, the 
Embassy was informed that the CEO had accused certain staff with corruption, and the same 
staff later produced other allegations in a letter dated March 2, 2007 which counter-accused 
the CEO of ‘destroying’ the institution. The CEO had also approved a loan to the Board 
chairman on the understanding that it would be liquidated against allowances. This letter was 
sent to a private independent newspaper along with a copy to Zambia’s State House in a 
manner that surprised both SIDA and the Board – and brought wider political factors into the 
equation.  
The Zambian Drug Enforcement Commission (DEC) without delay sought to investigate the 
accused staff while the Board formed a special working group to deal with the allegations 
about the CEO.  The CEO was duly suspended in a move which other staff deemed a ‘cover 
up’ for the Board’s own negligence. Later the same month the CEO was dismissed as the 
investigators detected ‘administrative irregularities’, misuse of office and failure to follow 
established procedures. Otherwise DEC made so little progress that the case was dropped 
after 8 months and the three accused members of staff were discharged. 
 
This did not prevent PZ’s continued downward spiral. SIDA documents suggested that in 
2007 the financial position deteriorated with a loss of US$550,000 compared to US$270,000 
in 2006 so that PZ in effect was insolvent. A SIDA memo dated 18/9/2008 had claimed that 
the 2007 audit report showed that PZ’s liabilities exceeded its balance sheet assets - clearly 
implying negative equity – obliging PZ to apply for a moratorium on the payment of interest 
and amortization. In early 2008, its application was approved, but loan disbursements were 
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then suspended, while active client numbers thereafter remained unknown. In the midst of all 
this SIDA desperately sought other potential investors to inject new lease of life into PZ 
(acting CEO, Lusaka, June 2008) and also comply with Bank of Zambia’s new regulations. 
SIDA maintained that the transformation and subsequent takeover of PZ represented a 
‘turnaround’ opportunity as the quote below reveals:  
 
“A positive development of the company (after transformation) would mean that the original objectives 
are still met, and that PZ would continue to be an important player in Zambian microfinance. We are 
confident that this way forward is the correct one, as things are today. It is therefore SIDA’s 
recommendation to the Board to support the transformation process by making possible the soon 
conversion, and furthermore the takeover of the company by the new investors”.  
 
Meanwhile, audited financial statements for 2006 were still not ready by January 2008. In 
April that year, SIDA wrote to the Board Chairman about the latest developments thus:  
 
“As I informed the Board at the last AGM, held on April 3 2008, SIDA has been assisting PZ in the 
search of investors for the company, in order to try and tackle a very difficult financial situation. 
During the last 6 months, there were several contacts with microfinance investors. Despite initial 
interest, they all preferred not to go further in the discussions as they became aware of the financial 
status of PZ”. 
 
The eventual takeover of PZ occurred in May 2008, with new owners later requesting SIDA 
to write off the loan if it was to continue. On 18 September 2008, a SIDA memo supported 
the proposal, but did not hide its disappointment with the position PZ had found itself in: 
 
“SIDA has supported PZ since its establishment in 1999, with grants (15.4 MSEK) and loan (8.8 
MSEK). The idea behind the support was to make a show case; ‘microfinance for the poor is viable in 
Zambia’. After 9 years of operations, we can conclude that PRIDE Zambia has not been able to become 
financially viable”. 
 
The SIDA episode finally came to a close when PZ was sold to new investors for as little as 
US$1!  So what made and produced this dramatic failure? To answer this question it is 
important to follow the different stakeholder narratives which have since emerged (Law, 
2006), beginning with the following inside, outside, and donor led accounts of the key actions 







Failure From The Insider: Informant Accounts 
 
One key informant, who had first joined PZ as loan officer and then became a senior 
manager, before acting as CEO between 2007- 2008 – the transition period, gave a moving 
account of how events unfolded. Asked him what he thought he replied: 
 
“The CEO that took over in 2004 came from a corporate banking background with no experience in 
either retail banking or microfinance. His vision was to turn PZ into a bank but without much internal 
consultation. He was very formal in style, intimidating and insensitive to contributions from junior 
staff. To support his ambition, he quickly approved of new expensive rented premises for the head 
office to portray PZ’s new image. He also made reshuffles and dismissed those he considered a 
‘threat’. New products got introduced as a way of broadening our financial base and ensuring 
sustainability. All this was initially exciting until he began interfering in the client assessment 
procedures with a view to favour those known to him by tribe, political affiliation or just as relations. 
As you would expect, big loans were being disbursed anyhow, making follow ups difficult-especially 
on those with the approval of the CEO. For some unknown reasons, the CEO struggled to trust anyone 
in PZ, and ended up creating ‘spies’ amongst staff. As a result unhappy employees (especially loan 
officers) went on a revenge path as the CEO applied a ‘divide and rule’ management style, creating 
tensions that blocked proper communication lines. So a battle ensued between some employees who 
wanted to ‘protect’ PZ and the CEO who most internal staff thought was fraudulent. To protect his 
interests, the CEO recruited an internal chief auditor from his former work place without formal 
interviews. This infuriated some of us who knew what was going on at a senior level and in my view 
this was the beginning of the end”.  
 
Asked about the Board’s position he responded that: 
 
“The board was not fit for purpose and never used to read reports sent to them, making it easy for the 
CEO to manipulate the situation. They were heavily dependent on what the CEO thought. Board 
members, we thought, were more interested in allowances from the frequent meetings held than the 
viability of PZ. Poor accountability meant that little was known about the magnitude of the problem. 
Money for lending and operational purposes ran out and SIDA refused to pump in money and instead 
suggested that new investors take over. The ownership of the institution needed to change in order to 
comply with Bank of Zambia’s 2006 Act.  So SIDA funded the audit of the organisation in order to 
ascertain its financial position. The audit done by an independent consultant revealed the financial 
position as dire – PZ was insolvent! This infuriated SIDA as it became apparent that the Board had 
been incompetent. The audited books were so bad that investors with initial interests pulled out. The 
PAR reached record levels of 65% (as against stipulated levels of 5%). PZ was terminally distressed 
and technically insolvent. This poor performance and turn of events were obviously disappointing for 
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the donors who over the years pumped in a lot of money to the tune of K14billion. Ironically, SIDA 
was not receiving all the reports and if they did, then it could be that unpleasant information was 
hidden, filtered or ‘massaged’ by the CEO”.  
 
Was the Board’s inaction largely due to indifference and lack of vigilance or was it an 
intentionally calculated way of ‘turning face’ and thus evading and denying PZ’s looming 
failure? Certain sources would suggest that, though Board members attended formal meetings 
they came largely unprepared, not having read those documents sent to them. How, then, did 
PZ’s Board members measure up? Did they have the necessary qualifications and 
experience? These questions are difficult to answer because two Board members declined to 
be interviewed. However, these other sources here implied that, as well as Board instability, a 
basic ‘lack of commitment’ also prevailed. 
Unfolding events as seen by those that actually did the grassroots work equally revealed deep 
rooted crumbling within PZ:  
Things on the ground were not as good as the figures suggested. Donors were at times kept in the dark or 
figures manipulated to please them by concealing our real problems such as the rising PAR. We needed 
their financial support because repayments were not as good and at times clients used their money to pay 
for those defaulting and in other cases loan insurance fund to clear arrears. The pace of commercialisation 
was being pursued hastily with limited internal consultation. Sustainability was a word no one wanted to 
hear as we associated it with threats from the top if we failed to meet set targets. As loan officers we felt 
very insecure with messages like ‘donors want to pull out’ and ‘donors want clients in big numbers’. In 
addition the flow of communication between branch staff and  senior management was very problematic-
I mean the CEO was very rigid and not listening to our views even though we were the ones with 
‘ground’ knowledge of PZ’s performance out there. I could say that PZ was a divided institution from 
inside long before new investors came in. Most of us were very suspicious of the CEO and his vision for 
PZ. Also the system was very porous and those with accounting background would collude in stealing 
clients’ money. The trouble is that took long to catch up with those involved in fraud and so most got 
away with it” (Former loan officer). 
After buying PZ for just US$1, its new investors were expected to reorganize it, and make it 
more sustainable in compliance with the regulatory Act. However, interviews revealed 
something unexpected: these new investors did not have the capital to invest and could not 
borrow from banks due to their lack of credibility. It was alleged that they instead siphoned 
all the remaining money amid further mutual recriminations. This in effect created what 
Bedeian and Armenakis (1998) called the cesspool syndrome where competent people leave 
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the organization. In this case, most senior employees left the ‘sinking ship’ as soon as the 
new ownership became clear.  
 
“Systems simply broke down, workers went without salaries-and as one would expect under those 
circumstances, they (especially loan officers) started ‘helping’ themselves to loan monies that clients 
paid back. Each branch would collect money for its own salaries and then contribute a certain 
percentage towards head office costs. Eventually, loan disbursement came to a halt as the new owners 
mismanaged whatever was collected. Some clients lost out on their savings in form of loan insurance 
fund as new owners transferred clients’ money (that had previously been under a separate account) to 
the main operational account and ‘chewed’ it. In the end, poor hard working clients with fully paid up 
loans lost out. However, clients on salary guaranteed loans gained because they never paid deposit 
upfront before borrowing and the evolving mess meant that loan deductions through their employers 
could not be continued. Equally, employees never received their terminal benefits and had no one to 
drag to court. It was a very bitter ending for employees especially for those that had been with PZ for a 
longer time. With hindsight, I think the CEO had set in process a target-driven managerialist culture 
that opened the door to institutional chaos and eventual demise of Pride Zambia” (former senior 
manager, Lusaka, Aug, 2010).  
 
Documents obtained from the Swedish Embassy (4/8/2010) indicated that the new owners 
desperately needed new injections of capital as a SIDA communication on December 18, 
2008 revealed: 
“Thank you for your letter received by e-mail November 13. As we have earlier mentioned, the 
Swedish Embassy is currently ending all contributions to the financial sector, and is not in a position to 
enter into new commitments. However, would you need assistance in identifying potential institutional 
investors from Sweden, please do not hesitate to contact us” 
The new owners had no face to lose in the absence of media and regulatory scrutiny. Many 
clients with group loans (mostly women and less educated) were so unaware that they 
continued with loan repayments, not realizing that loan officers would simply appropriate 
these dues instead. The then CEO claimed to be suspended and dismissed on the basis of an 
anonymous internal letter that was widely circulated outside. He further claimed that events 
took a different political turn when this letter accused him of supporting one of the main 
Zambian opposition parties and practicing tribalism. The letter had alleged that the CEO was 
corrupt and had divided and mismanaged the institution. His response was to blame the 
Board for his dismissal, claiming the required disciplinary process was ignored. He identified 
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one dominant Board member who had reputedly ‘hijacked’ this process after having opposed 
his original appointment – a claim which was disputed. He maintained that his dismissal had 
created a ‘management vacuum’ and that problems escalated when branch staff collected 
money from clients only to pocket it themselves , in some cases because their own salaries 
were not being paid. He believed that PZ would not have collapsed as it did had it not been 
for ‘political’ interference from those Board members seeking to take over the institution. In 
an effort to apportion blame, he further claimed that his successors mismanaged the 
remaining portfolio and, while he expressed relief to have been cleared of allegations, he 
claimed to have left PZ with relatively little. Asked what he would have done differently, he 
admitted: 
 ‘I should have been more ethical in my dealings with the Board chairman-whose loan advance I approved 
against lending rules’.    
      
Failure From The Outside: An Executive Account 
 
Pride Zambia was affiliated to AMIZ and its Executive director could have offered further 
insights about its failure. However, it was only after repeated probing that put this ‘down to 
mismanagement’, especially to conflicts between its senior management, CEO and Board. 
Board members allegedly undermined the CEO by so colluding with certain subordinates that 
other middle management officers filled the resulting power vacuum thus: 
 
“Microfinance in Zambia has evolved overtime. However, what is seemingly disturbing is the aspect of 
failing to differentiate between issues of governance and management.  There was a lot of ‘political’ 
interference from the Board and as a result those in management were failing to make independent 
decisions based on information from the ground. In addition, controls on lending and business ethics 
were basically ignored. For example we heard through the press that the CEO was recommending 
friends and relatives to borrow against laid down lending procedures, undermining loan officers and the 
head of credit, while holding them responsible for non-repayments. This created anger amongst middle 
management and some loan officers who then decided to take their frustrations to the press. By this 
time the damage was already done as the practice became widespread and junior staff started inviting 
their friends and relatives as well and malpractices became widespread. Liquidity crisis added to the 
already dire situation. PZ lost a lot of money as its salary guarantee loan scheme backfired. For 
instance, PZ extended huge salary based loans to Zambia’s central bank junior staff but failed to collect 
back most of it as the system got manipulated. 
As things deteriorated, donors withheld funds and asked Board members to dissolve themselves as they 
were allegedly not performing and not in control of things. By the new Central Bank regulations, SIDA 
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could not have shares in PRIDE, so they then decided to open up to private investors to take over. 
Privately, some board members had interest in buying it and it is understood that some of them were 
‘pulling some strings’ behind the scenes and unduly delaying the process. In my view, it is fraud on a 
large scale which pushed PZ to its knees. I also think that SIDA was in hurry to get rid of PZ because 
they had a reputation to protect. In addition new owners lacked experience and understanding of 
microfinance. They had a banking business background which did not sit well with the grassroots 
group lending methodology. Sadly, it was a case of embezzling from the poor, the very people PZ was 
meant to help out of poverty.” (AMIZ-Director, July 8, 2010)   
 
Interviews with a senior officer from the non-bank financial institution’s department at 
Zambia’s central bank revealed that PZ was not actually registered even after its new owners 
were given two years to comply with the new regulation rules. The Bank of Zambia had little 
formal information about PZ and one official claimed that anything they did know came 
largely through SIDA and ‘the grapevine’. The new owners had intended to comply but never 
got around to it, leaving it free-floating at the time of collapse. 
 
Failure from the Margins: the Donor’s Account  
The Country Director at the Swedish Embassy claimed:  
“As SIDA we wrote off the loan as a last attempt to save PZ. From our perspective, PZ had serious 
management problems, operated with an NGO mindset rather than a banking or profit driven spirit. 
However, with hindsight, we think that perhaps SIDA was too involved and yet we didn’t have an 
articulated microfinance policy to guide our relationship with PZ. SIDA was not there to directly 
manage the institution but expected PZ to report on how it used the monies loaned to them. The whole 
process lacked clear lines of accountability” (interview, 4/8/10, Lusaka).  
Another key player at SIDA with direct experience of its dealings with PZ reflected that:  
“I think we learned a lot from PZ case. The way in which SIDA supported the creation and growth of 
PZ did in fact in many ways contradict our own microfinance policy, as well as general “best practice”. 
Still, SIDA tried to get something going to “make a positive impact” in microfinance in Zambia and 
other countries. But, to make the long story short, I think we underrated the difficulties in mainly the 
following: having a local Board of Directors without any own financial interests in the business and not 
financial experts themselves, the general levels of corruption in Zambia and “creating” an organisation 
that from our point of view was independent, but from many PZ staff/Board was “SIDA property”.  
He further added: 
“One main problem was the setup, and the view from PZ that SIDA would always come to the rescue. 
In real terms, it was an independent organization, and the only SIDA connection by 2006 was a loan. 
So when internal problems started to come to our knowledge, we had contacts with the then CEO, and 
later the Board. I am not sure why the internal situation collapsed; some have mentioned tribal 
struggles (the CEO was Lozi, most middle management were Bemba), or some of the Board members 
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having big influence, or that the CEO was finding corrupt behaviour among the staff.  Financial 
numbers were getting redder, and despite meetings with the Board (also some times with other 
sponsors) very little action was taken to halt the fall. I got the impression that the Board did not really 
realise their responsibility for PZ. It was obvious the Board did not control events”.  
Other documents revealed that by end of 2007 SIDA had lost confidence in the Board’s 
capabilities, and as its financial situation deteriorated donors asked the Board members to 
dissolve following several years of continued losses.   
When asked what SIDA could have done differently, he replied: 
“I think that the massive support from SIDA helped a lot in creating an organisation that was not really 
efficient and responsible. Easy money can be detrimental in these cases. Good MFIs often grow step by 
step, not too much donor money, and with strict internal controls. In addition, there were too many 
SIDA programme officers involved, and not all with microfinance expertise. About as many as seven 
(7) different programme officers were involved in decisions regarding PZ during the last seven years. 
This probably did contribute to some lack of consistency in the advice given and complicated relations 




Power (2007, p 10) has observed that ‘empirical case analyses suggest that rigidities of core 
beliefs, managerial distractions, disregard for the views of outsiders, lack of regulatory 
compliance and difficulties in assembling critical information tend to be systemic factors 
contributing to organisational failure’. These different stakeholder accounts would suggest 
that relevant information might have been available but was not acted upon at the appropriate 
level of seniority right up to the Board. Self-generated failure materializes through a series of 
different events and misguided and/or dysfunctional actions (Mellahi, 2005; du Plessis, 2008) 
and in this case early warning signals were either disregarded or dismissed altogether. In 
addition the donor SIDA’s own frequent changes of officers dealing with PZ (7 different 
officers in 8 years) was another contributory factor since most such officers were later 
admitted to have lacked the necessary understanding of grassroots microfinance in practice.  
While PZ management lacked transparency, SIDA also underestimated its ownership 
problems. The question must be asked: who actually owned PZ?  Without shareholders SIDA 
became the de facto owner. Mersland and Strom (2009) have emphasized how uncertain 
ownership of not-for-profit MFIs can potentially inhibit their performance. PZ had started as 
a non-profit, donor-funded project, focused on the provision of credit and did not have a local 
ownership identity and many assumed that ‘it belonged to donors’ with no other financial 
interests at stake. It was thereby taken for granted that SIDA would control how their funds 
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were used (Hartarska, 2005) even if SIDA trusted that others would take prime responsibility. 
Such blurred accountability created space to embezzle donor (free) money and mismanage 
clients’ funds. In short, ambiguity about who constitutes the ‘principal’ in not-for-profit MFIs 
duly blurs managerial ‘agent’ accountability further down the line. SIDA’s unquestioning 
support may also have increased outreach (by local standards) without achieving the 
sustainability necessary to overcome early donor dependency. SIDA was latterly desperate to 
exit from a ‘failed showcase’ situation originally intended to demonstrate that ‘microfinance 
for the poor is viable in Zambia’. Even when it hurriedly supported a first takeover bid from a 
small number of ‘reputable’ Zambian businesspersons it also failed to invite other outside 
interest. 
The self-generated roots of PZ’s failure encompassed: overexpansion, inadequate 
skills/working practices, organizational instability, mismanagement and fraud and 
malfeasance. As the number of branches overstretched PZ’s management capacity, this 
translated into lenient credit policies, inefficient/distorted information systems, loose internal 
control and, ultimately, substandard governance. SIDA itself pinpointed Zambia’s poor 
repayment culture as well as those who mismanaged PZ’s growth in particular. Other MFIs 
have also struggled to identify Board members with appropriate backgrounds who are both 
willing and able to monitor management effectively (Labie, 2001). Data about board 
members’ background was not available here although the chairman was a local University 
Business School academic. Another was a Government permanent secretary and the other 
three with NGO backgrounds. According to Mersland and Strom (2009) MFIs primary tasks 
are to reach more clients in the poorer strata of the population and then achieve financial 
sustainability and here PZ failed to accomplish both. It never adopted Steinwand’s (2000) 
recommendation about internal auditing and allowed its CEO to appoint an auditor who only 
reported directly to him alone. The findings do however question Mersland and Strom’s 
(2009) assertion that local Boards improve MFI performance –in this case the PZ board was 
local but also ineffective and ultimately not fit for purpose. Finally it is no surprise that this 
saga took a political turn as it also has in India and Bangladesh (Financial Times, 3/3/2011) 
since leaders and supporters of Zambian opposition parties often claim to be victimised as 
soon as they are perceived to be a threat to official power. In the PZ case, political and tribal 




Conclusions and implications 
The case study has shown that MFIs in Zambia and elsewhere, that are donor driven and ‘top-
down’, can be so precariously founded that they come under pressure to reorganize or fail.  
This high dependence on donor funds that can be found in many sectors in SSA is 
particularly damaging to microfinance, where financial sustainability is of fundamental 
importance. The implication of this finding is that successful MFIs need not have a perpetual 
external push as donors’ money in most cases tends to give a ‘false start’ that was never there 
and ultimately leads to abuse of resources or failure. Microfinance institutions could fail 
when they are not conceived or designed to be sustainable. The findings of this study have 
implications for how international donors engage with the local constituency in various 
development initiatives aimed at reducing poverty in developing countries. Local ownership 
matters as it creates a sense of ‘belonging to’ necessary for promoting cohesion within the 
organization. It can also significantly change how MFIs’ resources are managed for their 
sustainability and clients’ outreach. In the case of PZ it was not clear as to who owned the 
firm’s resources. 
 
The most important implication of this study is that while PZ case is specific to Zambia, the 
conditions for ‘successful’ MFIs can be generalised to other donor-led MFIs elsewhere. A 
competent and motivated board together with institutional capacity are critical to advancing 
microfinance. Consistent with other studies on institutional capacity, MFIs that lack both 
human and systems capacity stand in danger of jeopardizing further growth. The implication 
here is that sufficient flows of donor funds are not a guarantee for success. The transparency 
in organization management can be regarded as much more important as demonstrated in 
PZ’s case. Pride Zambia’s downfall highlights in some sense persistent weaknesses in 
corporate governance, not just there but at other MFIs in developing countries where 
microfinance is still emerging. MFIs need good governance that ensures transparency of 
processes and clear lines of accountability amongst stakeholders in relation to MFI’s mission. 
For this to happen, MFIs boards should be in positions to challenge and act as a check on 
executives, and have the relevant background experience. In addition, MFIs need to invest in 
up to date management information systems that are well supported by established business 
ethics. This work therefore makes a contribution to understanding the reasons for failure and 
towards a case for a local context regulatory policy framework able to protect MFI’s client 
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deposits and further sustainable growth. The analysis made here also has considerable 
implications for ‘best practice’ within the microfinance industry undergoing 
commercialization. Replication and adaptation of policy models are never easy: historical, 
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